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Case studyMining4 Sept 2026 · 6 min read

Mapping the Jagersfontein tailings flow five days after the dam broke

A diamond mine tailings dam failed in the Free State and buried working farmland. Three years on, no footprint of it had been published, and the two area figures in the literature disagree by a factor of 1.6. We mapped it from five archive passes.

910 hain a single connected tailings flow, mapped from the archive five days after the wall came down
Site
Jagersfontein, Free State
Failure
11 Sep 2022
Scenes used
5
Control
19 ha
Buried, +5 days
1,189 ha
Connected flow
910 ha
Still buried, +55 days
750 ha
Turnaround
No tasking, no field visit

The problem

One of the decade's worst tailings failures has no published footprint. The two area figures in the literature disagree by a factor of 1.6, and neither states how it was derived.

What we did

Five archive passes over the impoundment and the runout, scored on one fixed vegetation loss threshold, with the same test run across two pre-failure dates as a control.

The result

910 hectares in one connected flow at five days, against 19 hectares from the control. A footprint a claims adjuster or a regulator can open and check.

01

Overview

A tailings dam at the Jagersfontein diamond workings, in the Free State, gave way early on 11 September 2022. Roughly five million cubic metres of saturated waste ran through the edge of the town and out across the grazing land beyond. Homes were destroyed and people died.

The flow ran about seven kilometres over dry ground before it reached the stream network. Tailings were traced a further fifty odd kilometres down the Prosesspruit and the Riet to the Kalkfontein reservoir inside a day. Farms were buried, and the people who worked them needed to know where and how much.

Three years later there is still no downloadable polygon of that footprint.

02

The challenge

Rapid mapping did not arrive here in the usual way. The European emergency mapping service was never activated for Jagersfontein at all: its log runs straight from a Spanish forest fire on 10 September to a French one on the 14th. South Africa's National Disaster Management Centre triggered the International Charter on Space and Major Disasters on 12 September, and the national space agency delivered two products, on 13 and 27 September. Neither is public.

What did circulate was good work, and partial. A landslide researcher published commercial imagery within a day and measured the plume at about 8.5 kilometres long and up to 1.5 wide. A comparison circulated five weeks later cited more than 26 square kilometres of grazing land damaged. A 2024 study in a disaster risk journal reports about 1,600 hectares.

Those last two figures differ by more than half, and neither publishes a method or a boundary. A farmer's compensation claim, a rehabilitation order and an insurer's reserve all turn on a number somebody can check.

03

What we did

The analysis covers a box of about 24 by 19 kilometres holding the impoundment, the town and the full overland runout, on five archive passes: 27 August and 6 September before the failure, then 16 September, 6 October and 5 November after it.

Ground counts as buried where the vegetation index falls by 0.10 or more between a pre-event scene and a post-event scene. That threshold was fixed in advance, applied to every pair of dates in the study, and never adjusted to bring the answer closer to anyone's published figure. Areas are the sum of connected patches of half a hectare and larger.

The same test also runs across the two scenes from before the failure. Those bracket ten days in which the dam was still standing, so whatever they return is what the method produces from sun angle, atmospheric correction, grazing and passing cloud shadow. Every result below is quoted against it.

Scoring is restricted to ground that carried some vegetation beforehand, a restriction set before any post-event scene was read. The Karoo in September is dry and sparse, so on this terrain the restriction moves the five day figure by about one per cent. On wetter ground it does considerably more.

04

What the imagery showed

comparison days after failure ground observed buried area patches largest patch
27 Aug vs 6 Sep, the control before 512.7 km² 19 ha 6 2.6 ha
6 Sep vs 16 Sep +5 512.7 km² 1,189 ha 34 910 ha
6 Sep vs 6 Oct +25 446.5 km² 1,135 ha 107 798 ha
6 Sep vs 5 Nov +55 512.7 km² 750 ha 56 624 ha

Cloud over part of the box on 6 October is why less ground was observed on that pass.

The vegetation index on 6 September and 16 September 2022, the fall between them, and the ground where that fall reaches 0.10. The flow is a single connected object of 910 hectares inside 1,189 hectares of total change.
The vegetation index on 6 September and 16 September 2022, the fall between them, and the ground where that fall reaches 0.10. The flow is a single connected object of 910 hectares inside 1,189 hectares of total change.

Across ten days in which nothing happened, the control finds 19 hectares of change, its largest patch 2.6 hectares. Five days after the failure the same test returns 1,189 hectares in 34 patches, and the largest single connected patch is 910 hectares. The event is sixty two times the control, and that one component alone is 350 times the largest thing the control could produce.

The identical test between 27 August and 6 September, before the dam failed, returns 19 hectares. Dry sparse Karoo in September is the condition under which a vegetation index is most likely to invent change, and it does not.
The identical test between 27 August and 6 September, before the dam failed, returns 19 hectares. Dry sparse Karoo in September is the condition under which a vegetation index is most likely to invent change, and it does not.

The 910 hectare component runs about eight kilometres from the impoundment across the ground below the town. That is the same length and orientation as the plume measured two days after the failure by a different observer, working from a different sensor.

Then the footprint shrinks: 1,135 hectares at 25 days, 750 at 55, with the largest connected component falling from 910 to 798 to 624. The core of the deposit stays put. Thin margins green over as the first vegetation pushes back through shallow tailings. A map made in October would have shown a third less ground than the same map made in September.

source figure method stated boundary published
This study, +5 days 1,189 ha buried, 910 ha in one flow yes, fixed threshold with a control yes
Torres-Cruz and O'Donovan 2023 plume 8.5 km by 1.5 km, 4 to 6 million m³ yes, commercial imagery and stereo elevation no
Comparison circulated Oct 2022 more than 26 km² of grazing land damaged no no
Marais et al. 2024 about 1,600 ha of agricultural and grazing land no no
05

What it means

This is a footprint of living ground that was buried, about 12 square kilometres of it. The published estimates of 16 and more than 26 square kilometres describe damaged land in a broader sense, and a good deal of the runout across the Karoo was bare before the tailings ever arrived. The three numbers measure three different things. Ours is the one that comes with a threshold, a control and a boundary you can load into a GIS.

The evidence was already sitting in the archive on 16 September 2022, five days after the wall came down and a day before the first Charter product was delivered. Nothing had to be tasked and nobody had to go to site.

Timing changes the answer. Between the 16 September pass and the 5 November pass the measured footprint falls by 37 per cent, so a single map made two months late understates what was buried. Liability on an event like this should be assessed against the earliest clean scene rather than the most convenient one, and for a site with a live impoundment the same test run on a schedule is a monitoring programme rather than a forensic one.

The control is what makes any of it arguable in front of a regulator. Nineteen hectares from ten quiet days is the floor this method produces on this terrain, and it is the fact that turns 910 hectares from an assertion into a measurement.

Run this on your own ground

Draw an area of interest, pick the dates, and the same analysis runs against the archive over your sites.

References

  1. Torres-Cruz L.A. and O'Donovan C. (2023). Public remotely sensed data raise concerns about history of Jagersfontein dam. Scientific Reports 13, 5556. doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-31633-5
  2. Marais L. et al. (2024). The Jagersfontein tailings dam failure. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 109, 104585. doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2024.104585
  3. International Charter Space and Major Disasters, activation requested by the National Disaster Management Centre, 12 September 2022.
  4. WISE Uranium Project, chronology of major tailings dam failures. wise-uranium.org/mdaf.html